Preview
ELECTRONICALLY FILED COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Wed , August 22, 2012 2:17:01 PM CASE NUMBER: 2012 CV 06113 Docket ID: 17456191 GREGORY A BRUSH CLERK OF COURTS MONTGOMERY COUNTY OHIO IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIOLisa JohnsonPO Box 13964 Case No.Dayton, OH 45413-0964 (BWC Claim No. 10-344805) Plaintiff-Appellant (Judge )vStephen R. Buehrer, Admin.,Bureau of Workers’ Compensation30 West Spring Street WORKERS’ COMPENSATIONColumbus, OH 43215-2233 COMPLAINT WITH JURY DEMANDandCommunity Blood Center349 South Main StreetDayton, OH 45402-2715 Defendant-Appelleea L. Plaintiff states that at all times herein mentioned, she was an employee ofDefendant, Community Blood Center, and that said Defendant is duly licensed to dobusiness in the State of Ohio, and that on or about 7/29/2010, and for some time priorthereto and since, was amenable to the Workers' Compensation Act of Ohio. 22 Plaintiff alleges that at the present time, Stephen R. Buehrer is the dulyqualified Administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation by virtue of the statutesof the State of Ohio.3. Plaintiff states that on or about 7/29/2010, while in the course and scope of andarising out of her employment for Defendant-Employer, Community Blood Center, shewas lifting a bandsaw and experienced pain in and injury to her right shoulder. 4. Plaintiff filed a claim with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation which wasassigned claim number 10-344805 and which recognizes the conditions(s): RightShoulder Strain. 5 On or about October 4, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion with the IndustrialCommission of Ohio requesting that her claim be allowed for the additional condition(s):Right Shoulder Supraspinatus and Infraspinatus Tendonopathy. 6. On April 2, 2012, Plaintiff's Motion came on for hearing before a DistrictHearing Officer who granted Plaintiff's Motion for the additional condition(s): RightShoulder Supraspinatus and Infraspinatus Tendonopathy. Defendant-Employer filed anappeal from this Order to the Staff Hearing Officer who, following hearing on May 29,2012, disallowed Plaintiff's claim for the additional condition(s): Right ShoulderSupraspinatus and Infraspinatus Tendonopathy. Plaintiff-Appellant filed an appeal to theIndustrial Commission of Ohio. On June 20, 2012, the Industrial Commission placed anorder refusing to hear Plaintiff-Appellant’s appeal. Plaintiff-Appellant filed her Notice ofAppeal with the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court.7. Plaintiff states that she suffers from: Right Shoulder Supraspinatus andInfraspinatus Tendonopathy as a result of or due to substantial aggravation by herindustrial injury of 7/29/2010. 8. The issue in this case is whether Plaintiff's Right Shoulder Supraspinatus andInfraspinatus Tendonopathy either directly resulted from or was substantially aggravatedby her industrial injury of 7/29/2010. W HEREF ORE, Plaintiff having set forth the basis of the jurisdictionof this Court over the action, prays that further proceedings be had in accordance with theCode of Civil Procedure, and asks that she be allowed to participate under the Workers’Compensation Act of Ohio for: Right Shoulder Supraspinatus and InfraspinatusTendonopathy; and for her costs herein expended and for such other relief as she may beentitled to under Sec. 4123.512 Ohio Revised Code. Respectfully sub: ed,/o/ 4 iff, By VU Vig Ved Dy Mega ich: ards, Es . (0024421) Attorney for Plaintiff Casper & Casper 3420 Atrium Blvd., Ste 160 Middletown, Ohio 45005 (513) 424-2401 (513) 433-0079 facsimile mrichards @casperlaw.comJURY DEMAND Plaintiff demands a trial by jury of eight (8). Respectfully submitted, Wf py: 2 LU yD) y| ‘hy “tp Mega ichards, Esq. (002442 1) Attorney for Plaintiff Casper & Casper 3420 Atrium Blvd., Ste 160 Middletown, Ohio 45005 (513) 424-2401 (513) 433-0079 facsimile mrichards @casperlaw.com REQUEST FOR SERVICETO THE CLERK: Please transmit by certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy of theforegoing Appeal and Workers’ Compensation Complaint with Jury Demand upon thefollowing parties all in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 4123.512 Ohio RevisedCode.Stephen R. Buehrer, Admin.,Bureau of Workers’ Compensation30 West Spring StreetColumbus, OH 43215-2233andCommunity Blood Center349 South Main StreetDayton, OH 45402-2715 ~ By Bf Megan/ hards, Esq. (0024421) Attorney for Plaintiff
Related Contentin Montgomery County
Case
PICKREL SCHAEFFER EBELING CO. LPA vs RICHARD PRATT
Aug 14, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 04379
Case
BEACON SALES ACQUISITION INC. vs DAYTON ROOFING SOLUTIONS ENTERPRISES LLC
Aug 15, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 04404
Case
OVERLOOK MUTUAL HOMES INC vs STANLEY PARROTT
Aug 15, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 04398
Case
TROY A. EDWARDS vs KETTERING ADVENTIST HEALTHCARE
Aug 12, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 04350
Case
IH CREDIT UNION vs BRITTANY DEPP
Aug 12, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 04345
Case
UNIVERSAL 1 CREDIT UNION INC vs BRANDEN HAWES
Aug 16, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 04412
Case
KATHY JEAN MCILVAIN vs RICHARD ONEAL MCILVAIN
Aug 14, 2024 |DISSOLUTION |2024 DM 00346
Case
CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION vs KRYSTAL WILLIAMS
Aug 12, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 04334
Case
NEWREZ LLC vs AMY M YATES
Aug 14, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 04392
Ruling
DAWN SUSAN POLK VS VS MEDIA, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION
Aug 13, 2024 |22STCV29462
Case Number: 22STCV29462 Hearing Date: August 13, 2024 Dept: 57 Plaintiff's motion for an order compelling Defendant to provide further responses to Plaintiff's Form Interrogatories (set two) is continued to August 29, 2024 at 8:30. Plaintiff's motion will be heard together on that day, at that time, with Defendant's motion for relief from waiver of its objections to Plaintiff's Form Interrogatories (set two).
Ruling
RICHARD CONELL VS TRANSDEV SERVICES, INC., A MARYLAND CORPORATION, ET AL.
Aug 13, 2024 |21STCV21273
Case Number: 21STCV21273 Hearing Date: August 13, 2024 Dept: 74 Richard Conell v. Transdev Services, Inc., et al. Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication This action arises from an employment dispute. On June 8, 2021, Plaintiff Richard Conell (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Transdev Services, Inc. (Transdev), Transdev North America, Inc. (TNAI), and Timothy Grensavitch (Grensavitch) (collectively, Defendants). On February 9, 2023, Defendants timely filed this motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. All evidentiary objections are preserved. First Cause of Action for Race Discrimination The court finds that Defendants have met their initial burden of showing that they had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Plaintiffs termination. According to Defendants evidence, Plaintiff admitted during his deposition that on April 26, 2020, he was involved in an accident when he hit a pole while driving a bus. (Scott Decl., Ex. F, Plaintiffs Depo. Vol. II, p. 292:21-25, 293:8-22.) Transdevs Safety Policies & Procedures manual states that employees are subject to termination following a preventable accident causing extreme property damage. (Id. at pp. 177:18-178:6.) The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue exists regarding his race discrimination claim. Plaintiff successfully does so. Plaintiff submits evidence (1) that a Hispanic driver hit a pole but was not fired (Russel Decl., Ex. 1, Chavira Dep. 110:16-111:6; 112:2-14); (2) a white driver had more than three accidents mandating termination under Safety Policies and Procedures but was not terminated because the general manager would hate to lose an employee based on those accidents (Plaintiffs Compendium of Evidence (PCOE), Ex. 11, TRANSDEV 000458); (3) the fact that a driver was white was taken into account for disciplinary action (Id. at TRANSDEV 000504-505); (4) uncertainty whether the damage to the bus was extreme, in which case Plaintiff would not have violated Defendants safety procedures; (SUDF 17); and, evidence suggesting one of the supervisors in question could have pressured Defendants to raise the price of estimated bus damage to furnish grounds for Plaintiffs termination. (Russell Decl., ¶¶ 31, 32; Ex. 30, 185:5-7; Ex. 31, 00363-364.). Accordingly, the court denies summary adjudication of the first cause of action for race discrimination. Second Cause of Action for Racial Harassment Defendants contend plaintiffs cause of action for racial harassment is time-barred because Plaintiff cannot base his FEHA claims on conduct before June 8, 2018. In opposition, Plaintiff argues tolling applies to the three-year statute of limitations for filing a DFEH complaint for conduct before April 7, 2018. Under the continuing-violations doctrine, a FEHA complaint is timely if discriminatory practices occurring outside the limitations period continued into that period. (Dominguez v. Washington Mutual Bank (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 721.) Here, the court finds Plaintiff has met his burden of showing that there are triable issues of fact whether the continuing-violations doctrine permits claims for allegedly unlawful conduct before April 7, 2018. For example, Plaintiff testifies in his declaration that in 2015 General Manager William Jackson (Jackson) began yelling at him during meetings that he was a black ass and that he thought that conduct would stop as soon as the contract negotiations concluded. (Declaration of Richard Conell, filed on April 24, 2023 (Conell Decl.), ¶ 3.) He also thought Jacksons conduct would stop when he stopped being a union president, but from February 2019 through May 2020, Jackson continued calling him black ass. (Conell Decl., ¶ 6.) In addition, Grensavitch, who worked under Jackson, commented that there was a totem pole of races with white people on top and Black people at the bottom. (Conell Decl., ¶ 6.) The court finds triable issues whether conduct before April 7, 2018, had reached a degree of permanence, the third prong of the continuing-violations doctrine. The court also finds that Plaintiff has met his burden of showing triable issues of material fact exist whether he was an employee when he served as the president of a union. Defendants argue that conduct during that period (June 9, 2018, through January 31, 2019) is not actionable because the union was paying Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff has testified that he continued receiving medical benefits as a TSI employee and denied that he took a leave of absence to serve in the union. (Conell Decl., ¶ 8.) Finally, the court finds Plaintiff has met his burden of showing triable issues of material fact exist whether he suffered harassment within the meaning of FEHA, including whether the harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe. (Conell Decl., ¶ 2 [testifying that General Manager Jackson would, among other things, call Plaintiff black ass to his face, make fun of stereotypes of Black people to Plaintiff, told Plaintiff that Black people (unlike, among others, whites and Asians) did not go to work; on multiple occasions, multiple employees would call him the N-word in the presence of Jackson and HR Manager Michelle De Alba, and no disciplinary action was taken against those employees; Grensavitch told Plaintiff that there was a totem pole of races with white people at the top and Black people at the bottom]; Plaintiffs Compendium of Evidence, filed March 15, 2024 (PCOE), Ex. 1 Chavira Depo., p. 96:9-18 [employee Kristopher Chavira testifying that she observed Grensavitch calling only Black employees bitch].) It is for the jury to decide whether that alleged conduct was sufficiently pervasive or severe. Accordingly, summary adjudication of the second cause of action for racial harassment is denied. Third and Fifth Causes of Action for Retaliation Triable issues of material fact exist whether Plaintiffs assisting other Black employees oppose racially discriminatory employment practices contributed to his termination. (PAMF 89, 92; SUDF 7) Accordingly, the court denies summary adjudication of the retaliation cause of action. Fourth Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent Harassment, Discrimination, or Retaliation The court has found triable issues exist regarding whether Defendants harassed Plaintiff based on race within the meaning of FEHA. Accordingly, summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action for failure to prevent is denied. Sixth Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy The court denies summary adjudication of wrongful termination in violation of public policy for the same reasons it denied summary adjudication of the first cause of action alleging intentional discrimination. Seventh Cause of Action for Violations of Civil Code Section 43 Besides the personal rights mentioned or recognized in the Government Code, every person has, subject to the qualifications and restrictions provided by law, the right of protection from bodily restraint or harm, from personal insult, from defamation, and from injury to his personal relations. (Civ. Code, § 43.) Defendants argue that because the seventh cause of action is derivative of the other claims, it fails for the same reasons they argued the others have failed. (Motion, p. 26:19-25.) However, the court has found that Plaintiff has met his burden of showing triable issues of material fact exist as to his harassment claim. Accordingly, summary adjudication of the seventh cause of action violations of Civil Code section 43 is denied. Eighth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress The court finds unpersuasive Defendants argument that Plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim is barred by the workers compensation exclusivity rule. (Cf. Fretland v. County of Humboldt (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1492; Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 138, 148.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs IIED claim fails because (1) none of the alleged wrongful conduct is sufficiently extreme or outrageous, and (2) Plaintiff underwent a psychiatric consultation on May 15, 2020, and he did not attribute any stress, anxiety, or depression to the alleged harassment (referring to an evaluation from Perry Maloff, MD that is attached Attorney Scotts declaration as Exhibit N). For the reasons cited in the discussions of the first through seventh causes of action, the court finds Plaintiff has presented evidence showing triable issues exist regarding whether Defendants conduct was sufficiently extreme or outrageous. Accordingly, summary adjudication of the eighth cause of action for IIED is denied. CONCLUSION The court denies summary adjudication of all causes of action and summary judgment. Defendants shall give notice.
Ruling
FCS056747 - VILLA, MARIA V. RALPHS-PUGH CO. INC. (DMS)
Aug 15, 2024 |FCS056747
FCS056747Motion for Approval of PAGA SettlementTENTATIVE RULINGPlaintiff’s unopposed motion for approval of the PAGA settlement is granted.
Ruling
Donovan Young vs Santa Cruz Staffing, LLC
Aug 13, 2024 |21CV03049
21CV03049YOUNG v. SANTA CRUZ STAFFING (UNOPPOSED) MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS AND PAGA ACTION SETTLEMENT The motion is granted. Based on the pleadings submitted, the settlement is entitled to a presumption of fairnessand no evidence having been presented to overcome the presumption, the motion for finalapproval is granted.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.
Ruling
ROSS FELIX VS MEDVERSANT TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, ET AL.
Aug 16, 2024 |21GDCV00283
Case Number: 21GDCV00283 Hearing Date: August 16, 2024 Dept: A LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT - BURBANK DEPARTMENT A AUGUST 16, 2024 CONTINUANCE LAW AND MOTION MATTERS Los Angeles Superior Court Case # 21GDCV00283 23BBCV01317 23BBCV02519 Due to an unexpected urgent matter that arose this week, additional time is necessary to hear this matter and issue a Tentative Ruling. On the Courts own motion, the matters are continued to AUGUST 20, 2024 at 10:00 a.m., or any date thereafter upon stipulation of counsel. ORDER The law and motion matters set for August 16, 2024 for cases 21GDCV00283, 23BBCV01317 and 23BBCV02519 came on for hearing on August 16, 2024, with appearances/submissions as noted in the minute order for said hearing, and the court, being fully advised in the premises, did then and there rule as follows: THE LAW AND MOTION MATTERS FOR 21GDCV00283, 23BBCV01317 and 23BBCV02519 ARE CONTINUED TO AUGUST 20, 2024, AT 10:00 AM, OR ANY DATE THEREAFTER UPON STIPULATION OF COUNSEL. PLAINTIFFS IN EACH MATTER ARE TO GIVE NOTICE. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Ruling
24CV-0204258
Aug 17, 2024 |24CV-0204258
FAUST VS. SUNFLOWER MANAGEMENT & OPERATIONS, LLCCase Number: 24CV-0204258Tentative Ruling on Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel: Adam Rose of Frontier Law Center moves to berelieved as counsel for Audrey Faust, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals. The Courtnotes that this is a class action matter that also brings a claim under the Private Attorney Generals Act.CRC Rule 3.1362 provides the procedural requirements for a motion to be relieved as counsel. In particular, CRC3.1362 requires the use of specific mandatory Judicial Council forms for the Notice and Motion (MC-051) andSupporting Declaration (MC-052). Both forms and the proposed Order (MC-053) must be served on the clientand all parties who have appeared in the case at either the current address or the last known address that has beenconfirmed within thirty days. CRC 3.1362(d). In this matter, Plaintiff Audrey Faust was served at her last knownaddress. Counsel was not able to confirm the validity of this address within the last 30 days. To obtain a currentaddress, counsel mailed the motion return receipt requested and called Plaintiff’s last known phone number.There is no evidence that any other efforts have been made. The efforts made are minimal.A declaration must be filed that states in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of theattorney-client relationship why a motion under CCP § 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under CCP §284(1). Counsel represents that “There has been an irreconcilable breakdown in communications with AudreyFaust, making further representation infeasible.” Lack of contact with a client is not necessarily the same as abreakdown of the attorney-client relationship. This is a class action matter. There is no discussion in the motionregarding the status of other class members. Also, the Court notes that under Item 7 in the Declaration, counselwrote, “The first amended complaint was served, and no answer is expected.” This is a curious statement. Itwould appear that, despite Plaintiff having filed this case in February of 2024, the Defendant has not been servedas there is no proof of service in the file. This would be a violation of CRC 3.110. If no answer is expected, itappears that this case will not be moving forward. “A dismissal of an entire class action, or of any party or causeof action in a class action, requires court approval.” CRC 3.770(a). Rather than proceeding by requesting adismissal from the Court, counsel is attempting to withdraw. If the Court were to grant the instant motion,Plaintiff would be left with no representation and would have to find counsel willing to take the case for thepurpose of getting the matter dismissed. This is not in the interest of justice.Due to the lack of proper notice to Plaintiff and because it appears that counsel is attempting to abandon the matterinstead of proceeding in the proper fashion under CRC 3.770(a), the motion is DENIED without prejudice. Aproposed Order was provided but it cannot be modified to reflect the Court’s ruling. Plaintiff’s counsel is toprepare the Order.
Ruling
Gerardo Martinez vs Bob Campbell Ranches Inc et al
Aug 21, 2024 |Judge Patricia Kelly |21CV02718
/media/1583
Ruling
Mckenzie vs. Marquis Companies I, Inc.
Aug 17, 2024 |22CV-0200380
MCKENZIE VS. MARQUIS COMPANIES I, INC.Case Number: 22CV-0200380The Court has reviewed and granted a Request to continue this matter to Monday, October 21,2024, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 64. No appearance is necessary on today’s date.
Document
DENNIS W. SNIDER vs PROGRESSIVE DIRECT INSURANCE COMPANY
Aug 13, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 04361
Document
ALLY BANK vs WAM EXPEDITE LLC
May 09, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 02680
Document
FIG 20 LLC FBO SEC PTY vs DANIEL LAFORCE JR
Oct 02, 2023 |CIVIL |2023 CV 05220
Document
CAROLYN WHITE vs BARBARA ROSS-GRAVES
Aug 16, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 04427
Document
BRANDON G WINTERS vs NANCY A ARSAN
Dec 09, 2020 |DIVORCE |DIVORCE WITH CHILDREN (DRC) |2020 DR 00906
Document
ALLY BANK vs WAM EXPEDITE LLC
May 09, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 02680
Document
JOSEPHINE SLY vs STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
Aug 12, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 04354
Document
TROY A. EDWARDS vs KETTERING ADVENTIST HEALTHCARE
Aug 12, 2024 |CIVIL |2024 CV 04350
